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Abstract. Integrated Water Resources Management
(IWRM) recommends, among other things, that the manage-
ment of water resources systems be carried out at the low-
est appropriate level in order to increase the transparency,
acceptability and efﬁciency of the decision-making process.
Empowering water users and stakeholders transforms the
decision-making process by enlarging the number of point
of views that must be considered as well as the set of rules
through which decisions are taken. This paper investigates
the impact of different group decision-making approaches
on the operating policies of a water resource. To achieve
this, the water resource allocation problem is formulated as
an optimization problem which seeks to maximize the ag-
gregated satisfaction of various water users corresponding to
different approaches to collective choice, namely the utilitar-
ian and the egalitarian ones. The optimal operating policies
are then used in simulation and compared. The concepts are
illustrated with a multipurpose reservoir in Chile. The anal-
ysis of simulation results reveals that if this reservoir were
to be managed by its water users, both approaches to collec-
tive choice would yield signiﬁcantly different operating poli-
cies. The paper concludes that the transfer of management
to water users must be carefully implemented if a reasonable
trade-off between equity and efﬁciency is to be achieved.
1 Introduction
Themanagementoflarge-scalewaterresources, suchasmul-
tipurpose reservoirs, has traditionally been carried out by
public administration. The motivations for a public manage-
ment are both political and ﬁnancial: to promote equity and
arbitrate conﬂicts among water users, to maintain ownership
on a strategic infrastructure, to ensure that certain water ser-
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vices viewed as public goods are preserved, and to promote
the development of water resources which are highly capi-
tal intensive with long time investments (Dinar et al., 1997).
As pointed out recently by various authors (Hjorth et al.,
1998; WCD, 2000) the performance of many multipurpose
schemes has not met the expected targets. Consequently, a
(partial) transfer of management to water users is often cited
as a potential alternative to a public (centrally-organized) ad-
ministration.
This paper investigates the impacts of different approaches
to collective choice on the management of a water resource
system. More speciﬁcally, an optimization model is de-
veloped to determines optimal release policies for a multi-
purpose reservoir while explicitly considering multiple wa-
ter users and different group decision-making approaches.
The model seeks to maximize the aggregated satisfaction of
the different water users and relies on ﬂexible constraints
to quantitatively model preferences formulated by the wa-
ter users. The use of ﬂexible constraints instead of objec-
tive functions is motivated by the fact that a ﬂexible con-
straint includes a threshold below which a solution will be
rejected and a threshold above which solutions are equally
feasible (Dubois et al., 1996). In other words, between these
two thresholds, the ﬂexible constraint behaves as a local ob-
jective. In addition, ﬂexible constraints also remove barrier
language for non-technical water users since they can be de-
scribed by linguistic variables and mathematically encoded
as fuzzy sets. The idea here is that fuzzy sets are used as
a vehicle to capture and process linguistically described wa-
ter users’ preferences formulated by both technical and non-
technical water users. In this paper, the terms “stakeholder”,
“water user”, “actor” and “objective” play the same role:
supplying preferences across alternatives. They can there-
fore be used interchangeably.
The optimal decision is deﬁned as the solution for which
the global satisfaction of the different water users is maxi-
mal. An aggregation of water users’ preferences is therefore
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needed and must be carried out taking into account the com-
plex rules that characterize the group decision-making. This
paper illustrates the impact of these decision rules on the per-
formance of a multipurpose reservoir as if it were managed
by the water users. The second section is devoted to ﬂexible
constraints and objectives. Section 3 presents various ﬂex-
ible constraints satisfaction problems and how they can be
interpreted in social choice theory. Then, the optimization
of reservoir operation is discussed in Sect. 4 and the case
study introduced in Sect. 5. Simulation results associated to
various group decision-making approaches are analyzed in
Sect. 6. Finally, concluding remarks are presented.
2 Flexible constraints versus objectives
Many water resources systems have been developed and
managed to meet the demands for water formulated by mul-
tiple users, some of them with multiple objectives. Unfortu-
nately, these objectives can seldom be fully satisﬁed due to
the presence of various constraints, which can be of physical,
legal or ﬁnancial nature. The major difference between con-
straints and objectives comes from the imperativeness with
which they must be satisﬁed: satisfying a constraint is more
imperative than satisfying an objective (Slany, 1996). An ob-
jective function, on the other hand, associates to each alter-
native (or solution) r a value g(r) so as to provide a complete
ranking of the set of feasible solutions: r g r0 if and only if
g(r)≥g(r0), which means “the objective g prefers r to r0”.
The notion of ﬂexible (fuzzy) constraint is an attempt to
represent both constraints and objectives by fuzzy sets. Let
< be the set of all solutions (feasible, non-feasible or par-
tially feasible) and O a fuzzy relation related to constraint C.
A ﬂexible constraint C can be described by a fuzzy set de-
ﬁned by O in <. For a solution r∈<, the membership grade
µO(r) associated by O to r speciﬁes the satisfaction level of
r according to the constraint C:
µO(r)=1. means r totally satisﬁes C
µO(r)∈]0,1[. means r partially satisﬁes C
µO(r)=0. means r totally violates C
µO(r)≥µO(r0). means r is preferred to r0
For a classical constraint, the relation O is binary, whereas
for a ﬂexible constraint, O is a fuzzy relation. In other words,
O isthefuzzysetofsolutionsmoreorlesssatisfyingtheﬂex-
ible constraint C. The relation O therefore rank-orders the
feasible solutions like an objective function. But the ﬂexible
constraint differs from the objective function in that it also
models a threshold below which a solution will be rejected
and a threshold above which solutions are equally feasible.
In a sense, a ﬂexible constraint can be viewed as the associ-
ation of a constraint and a criterion; the former deﬁnes the
support of the ﬂexible constraint, while the latter rank-orders
the solutions according to preferences (Dubois et al., 1996).
The methodology described in this paper heavily relies on
preferences formulated by water users. These preferences
will be encoded as fuzzy sets in the optimization algorithm.
More speciﬁcally, the membership grade µ translates water
user satisfaction on the unit interval: the membership grade
is 1 when the alternative completely satisﬁes the water user,
and it is equal to 0 when the solution is completely rejected
by the same water user. In the ]0,1[ interval, solutions are
partially accepted/rejected. Note that the term satisfaction
has a logical meaning here: to “satisfy” a preference means
thatthepriorconditionsdeﬁningthepreferencearemet. This
deﬁnition has therefore no psychological sense in that it does
not reﬂect a mental state of pleasure.
3 Flexible constraint satisfaction problems
Classical Constraint Satisfaction Problems (CSP) rely on
“crisp” (hard) constraints: constraints can either be satisﬁed
or not. In CSP, a solution must satisfy all constraints of the
problem. A problem is said to be “underconstrained” if it
accepts more than one solution. In that case, the decision
maker has to consider other constraints to differentiate be-
tween these solutions. In contrast, when there is no solu-
tion, the problem is said to be “overconstrained” and one or
more constraints must be relaxed. The Flexible Constraint
Satisfaction Problem (FCSP) generalizes CSP by substitut-
ing at least one hard constraint by a ﬂexible constraint. In
a sense, this allows the decision maker to introduce an objec-
tive function in the problem, which can be used to relax an
“overconstrained” problem, or to differentiate the solutions
of an “underconstrained” problem.
Deﬁne C as a ﬁnite set of ﬂexible constraints
{C1,C2,...,CJ}, O as a ﬁnite set of fuzzy re-
lations {O1,O2,...,OJ} and r as an alternative
(r∈<). Each alternative r is associated with a proﬁle
µr=(µO1(r),µO2(r),...,µOJ(r)) ∈ [0,1]J, where
µOj(r) is the satisfaction level of the j-th ﬂexible constraint
associated with the alternative r.
To rank the alternatives or select an alternative that best
satisﬁes the ﬂexible constraints, one can compute the global
scores D(r) from the proﬁle of any alternative r using an
aggregated satisfaction D : RJ→R. In classical constraint
satisfaction problem, the most common deﬁnition of the ag-
gregated satisfaction D is based on the minimum operator
(the min-ordering):
D(r) = µO1∩O2∩...∩OJ(r) = min
Cj∈C
µOj(r) (1)
The minimum operator belongs to a family of operators
called triangular norms which have interesting mathematical
properties (Zimmermann, 1991).
The best solutions r∗ are therefore those for which the ag-
gregated satisfaction D is maximum:
r∗ = max
r∈<
min
Cj∈C
µOj(r) (2)
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The solutions r∗ maximize the satisfaction level of the least
satisﬁed constraint, and therefore the FCSP is a max-min op-
timization problem (max-min solutions). The use of the min
operator has been advocated by (Bellman and Zadeh, 1970).
They adopted a logic point of view, interpreting the intersec-
tion of two fuzzy sets (which is obtained by combining with
the min operator their membership grade functions) as the
“logical AND” between two statements. It must be pointed
out that this max-min approach is coherent with the proper-
tiesofaﬂexibleconstraint, namelyitcannotbeviolated. Any
solution with a zero satisfaction level for a single constraint
is rejected as impossible.
In social choice theory, the min-ordering corresponds to
an egalitarian approach: every member (water user) has a
veto power like the permanent members of the UN Security
council. As soon as one user rejects a solution, it is globally
rejected by the whole group.
Despite its pleasing mathematical properties, the min-
ordering has two major drawbacks:
– it lacks of discrimination power by concentrating on the
worst aspects of the alternatives;
– maxmin solutions are not Pareto optimal, meaning
that the satisfaction of other water users could still be
improved without deteriorating the satisfaction of the
least-satisﬁed water user.
The ﬁrst issue has been addressed by several authors, (e.g.
Dubois et al., 1996; Dubois and Fortemps, 1999), who have
proposed various reﬁnements such as the leximin or the dis-
crimin orderings. The second drawback has a practical di-
mension; the fact that Pareto optimality cannot be guaran-
teed implies that certain water users will not easily accept
the solutions since the resource is not efﬁciently managed.
However, as the solutions are taken on the basis of the least-
satisﬁed water user, they are consistent with the notion of
justice as discussed by Rawls (1970).
An alternative deﬁnition of the aggregated satisfaction D
is based on the maximum operator. It represents a group
decision-making in which each participant is a potential dic-
tator (max-ordering). Here, as soon as a water user is fully
satisﬁed with a solution, it is accepted by the whole group. In
other words, this approach looks for the full satisfaction of at
least one water user, nothwithstanding the satisfaction of the
other users. Then the optimal solutions are the solutions of a
maximax optimization problems (max-max solutions). How-
ever, the max-ordering suffers from the same drawbacks as
the min-ordering.
In between these two extremes the utilitarian decision-
making approach builds an additive satisfaction D using, for
example, a sum over all preferences. The solutions with the
highest utility are the ones preferred (max-sum solutions):
r∗ = max
r∈<
X
j
µOj(r) (3)
Incontrasttomax-minormax-maxsolutions, max-sumsolu-
tionsareconsistentwiththetraditionofmulticriteriadecision
making and the idea of trade-off.
The utilitarian approach to collective choice also often im-
plies that the actors, and thus their constraints, do no have the
same importance. For example, diverting water for munici-
pal water supply may be more important than for irrigation
purposes. If a constraint is more important, it should play a
more signiﬁcant role in the aggregation function (Eq. 3).
Various methods exist for including relative importance.
Here, the constraints are ordered with respect to each other
by giving them a priority degree, which can be considered
as a weight. In other words, the weight reﬂects the rela-
tive importance of the constraint as explained in Choo et al.
(1999). We used Saaty’s AHP method to generate a ﬁrst set
of weights, which was then adjusted by the experts familiar
with the system. This procedure was made possible here be-
cause (i) the number of experts was limited and (ii) there was
little room for interpretation of the relative importances as
priorities are framed in the Chilean Water Code. In most wa-
ter resources planning and management problems, however,
the number of decision-makers is likely to be larger resulting
in an heterogenous group in which a consensus on a weight
vector will not easily emerge. In that case, one option might
be to construct a separate hierarchy of the decision-makers
but this issue is still under discussion in the literature (Srdje-
vic, 2007; Ramanathan, 2001; Honert and Lootsma, 1996).
Saaty’s AHP method relies on pairwise comparisons be-
tween constraints to determine the weights. This procedure
starts with the construction of a J×J matrix A in which the
element aij gives the relative importance of the constraint Ci
with respect to the constraint Cj. Note that the element aji
is calculated from aji=1/aij using Saaty arithmetic scale 1–
9. Other scales could have been used such as the geomet-
ric scale (Lootsma, 1996), which uses the same semantic
description as Saaty but with a different range (e0γ to e8γ)
where γ is a constant. The weight vector ω is then obtained
from
Aω = λmaxω (4)
where λmax is the maximum eigenvalue of A. This vector
is the importance associated with each of the constraints Cj
for j ∈ [1,2,...,J]. More details about this methodology
can be found in Saaty (1980). An alternative to the eigen-
vector technique is the Logarithmic Least Squares Technique
(LLST), which chooses the weights that minimize the loga-
rithmic square deviations (Beroggi, 1999).
We further assume that the weight factors are normalized
according to
X
j
ωj = 1, ωj ∈ [0,1]. (5)
Once the weight vector is calculated, it can be introduced in
the deﬁnition of the utilitarian, aggregated, satisfaction D by,
for example, directly multiplying the satisfaction level µOj
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by its weight ωj. The optimization problem (Eq. 3) becomes
the well-known weighted arithmetic mean:
Dp(r) =
X
j
ωjµOj(r) (6)
Another option to aggregate the individual satisfaction levels
µOj is to use the weighted geometric mean (WGM). In fact,
the multiplicative variant of AHP (Lootsma, 1996), which re-
lies on WGM and LLST, could have been used as the WGM
is more consistent with AHP in terms of priorities and judge-
ments (Forman and Peniwati, 1998). However, we choose to
work with the standard AHP because (i) the weighted arith-
metic mean was felt to be more intuitive to the experts and
(ii) the weight vector was “manually” adjusted by the experts
so as to better reﬂect their perceptions. In practice, however,
this last step is not mandatory and a sensitivity analysis with
different weight vectors may be carried out.
The weighted arithmetic mean is, in turn, a particular case
of the generalized averaging operator when the parameter
p=1 (Kaymak and van Nauta Lemke, 1998)
Dp(r) = {
X
j
ωjµ
p
Oj(r)}1/p , p ∈ R \ {0} (7)
and
D0(r) =
Y
j
µOj(r)ωj (8)
As a matter of fact, when p→∞ the aggregation function
(Eq. 7) becomes equivalent to the max-operator, whereas
when p→−∞ the aggregation is equivalent to the min-
opeator. In between these two extremes, the aggregation
Function (7) can be tailored to model utilitarian decision-
making. With the aggregation function (7), the best solution
rp,∗ of the FCSP is given by
rp,∗ = max
r∈<
{
X
j
ωjµ
p
Oj(r)}1/p, p ∈ R \ {0} (9)
and
r0,∗ = max
r∈<
Y
j
µOj(r)ωj (10)
As mentioned early, the aggregation should also produce
Pareto-optimal solutions. Utilitarian solutions (i.e. solutions
corresponding to ﬁnite values of p in Eq. 9) are all Pareto
optimal, but notwithstanding this fact, these solutions might
not necessarily be well perceived by water users since com-
pensation between water users’ satisfaction is assumed. In
other words, a consensus might be difﬁcult to reach, because
certain water users might consider the resulting operating
policy as a “zero-sum” game, while others might see it as
a “positive-sum” game. It must be stressed here that the util-
itarian and egalitarian conceptions of collective choice as-
sume that:
– decision makers will choose among alternatives by ar-
ticulating prior preferences;
– disagreement is the result of competition for the use of
water.
The ﬁrst assumption is often criticized by political scientists,
because it fails to adequately take into account those water
services that can be viewed as public goods (Sagoff, 1998):
a typical example is ﬂood control. In other words, these two
conceptions only deal with “consumer” (water user) prefer-
ences and not “citizen” preferences.
4 Reservoir operation optimization
The different group decision-making approaches discussed
in the previous section and their impacts on the manage-
ment of a water resources are illustrated with a multipur-
pose reservoir operation problem. The reservoir operation
problem typically consists in determining release decisions
that should be made in order to meet the demands formu-
lated by various water users/uses such as hydropower gener-
ation, ﬂood control, low ﬂow maintenance, recreation, irriga-
tion, etc. Various models have been developed in the past to
address this operation problem. The most common math-
ematical programming techniques are linear programming
(LP), dynamic programming (DP) and non-linear program-
ming NLP. Deterministic models use a speciﬁc sequence
of streamﬂows to determine operating policies. Stochastic
models, on the other hand, rely on statistical descriptions of
the streamﬂow and forecast process to obtain operating poli-
cies. In this paper, a stochastic dynamic programming SDP
formulation is adopted because it can handle stochastic in-
ﬂows, non-linear objective functions and constraints, and a
large number of stages. In addition, since the problem only
involves one reservoir, the curse of dimensionality found in
SDP is not an issue. See Labadie (2004) for a recent review
of these techniques.
In SDP release decisions are made to maximize (minimize)
current beneﬁts (costs) plus the expected beneﬁts (costs)
from future operation, which are represented by the recur-
sively calculated cost-to-go function F∗. In reservoir opera-
tion studies, the most common state variables are the volume
of water in the reservoirs and a description of current hy-
drologic conditions (Tejada-Guibert et al., 1995). Let n be
the number of stages remaining until the end of the planning
horizon, rt be the release during period t, at the inﬂow dur-
ing period t, st the storage at the beginning of time period t,
E the expectation operator, α the discount factor, and gt the
system operational beneﬁt during period t.
Considering the reservoir operation problem as periodic
and inﬁnite-horizon the long-term optimal operating policy
can be found by the recursive solution of the functional SDP
equation
F∗
n(st,at) = max
rt
{gt(st,at,rt)
+ E
at+1|at
αF∗
n−1(st+1,at+1)} (11)
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subject to
st+1 = st + at − rt − lt − et(st) − it (12)
smin ≤ st+1 ≤ smax (13)
rmin ≤ rt ≤ rmax (14)
where smin and smax are the lower and upper bounds on stor-
age, rmin and rmax are the lower and upper bounds on release,
lt are the spillage losses, it are lateral irrigation withdrawals,
et are the evaporation losses.
The recursive Eq. (11) is carried out until the change in the
cost-to-go function from one iteration to the next becomes
nearly constant for each point of the discrete state space do-
main (Loucks and Beek, 2005). The resulting steady-state
release policy r∗
t and cost-to-go functions F∗
n constitute the
sets of solutions that can be used by reservoir operators to
derive an optimal release policy. In this study, the time span
of a stage is one month, and the period is one year. In prac-
tice, to solve the SDP model (Eq. 11), the hydrologic state
and the storage variables must be discretized into na and
ns intervals respectively, each represented by a characteris-
tic value (Yakowitz, 1982). The continuous domain (at,st)
is thus replaced by a grid so that an approximate solution
of (Eq. 11) can be developed by evaluating (11) at the grid
points only. Here, 12 grids of 110 points are used (na=5 and
ns=22), which is consistent with the discretization schemes
adopted in other studies (Kim and Palmer, 1997; Tejada-
Guibert et al., 1995; Karamouz and Vasiliadis, 1992).
When the algorithm moves from one stage (e.g. n−1) to
the next (e.g. n), the values of Fn−1 are available only at the
grid points. However, in order not to restrict the release de-
cisions rt to the trajectories imposed by the grid points, the
cost-to-go functions F∗
n−1 are approximated by cubic splines,
that is, individual multivariate cubic polynomials deﬁned on
each subregion of the state space domain delimited by the
grid points. The spline coefﬁcients are determined by re-
quiring the spline to interpolate F∗
n−1 at each point of the
state space domain (Johnson et al., 1993). The interpolations
F∗
n−1 are only carried out with respect to the storage dimen-
sion since the hydrologic state is still described by transition
probabilities.
In this study, the release decisions are determined by a
variant of SDP, called FSDP, in which the objective func-
tion of the recursive equation is no longer an economic one,
but rather corresponds to a FCSP in which the ﬂexible con-
straints encode the satisfaction levels of the different wa-
ter users and objectives. It must be stressed here that the
physical constraints are still modeled by hard constraints.
Denote µOj,t(st,at,rt) as the satisfaction of the jth water
user/objective at time t when the storage is st, the inﬂow is at
and the decision is rt. Let ωj,t be the relative importance of
the jth water user/objective at time t with
P
j
ωj,t=1. In ad-
dition, let Dn(st,at) be the expected satisfaction-to-go from
the optimal operation of the system from the current period t
(n remaining stages) to the end of the planning horizon given
that the system’s state in period t is (st,at). The steady-state
release policies are found by solution of:
D∗
n(st,at) =
[maxrt{
PJ−1
j=1 ωj,tµ
p
Oj,t(st,at,rt)+
P
at+1 ρ(at+1 | at)ωJ,tD∗p
n−1(st+1,at+1)}]p−1
(15)
where ρ(.) are ﬂow transition probabilities estimated from
historical ﬂow records.
Similar approaches can be found in Fontane et al. (1997);
Esogbue and Kaprzyk (1998); Tilmant et al. (2002b) to de-
rive operating policies of multipurpose reservoirs with im-
precise operating objectives. A comparison between FSDP
and SDP derived policies is described in Tilmant et al.
(2002a).
In this study, the so-called Flexible SDP (FSDP) func-
tional Eq. (15) will be used to derive reservoir operating
policies corresponding to different group decision-making
approaches as encountered in social choice theory. Sev-
eral FSDP models will be developed with p=1,p→∞ and
p→−∞ to determine optimal release decisions and then
simulate the operation of the multipurpose reservoir with
these three different rules. If the multiplicative variant of
AHP is used, then the aggregation function would corre-
spond to Eq. (8), i.e. the weighted geometric mean, and the
FSDP) model woud be implemented with p=0. Meaning-
ful performance indicators, such as the reliability in meeting
irrigation water demands, will then be estimated from simu-
lation results and used to compare the three FSDP formula-
tions corresponding to three different conceptions of collec-
tive choice.
5 Case study
This reservoir is located in the Maule river basin near Santi-
ago in the central part of Chile (Fig. 4). Water in the basin
was used primarily for irrigation and more recently for hy-
dropower generation. The Colb` un hydropower plant is dis-
patched together with the other power plants, both thermal
and hydro, of the Sistema Interconectado Central, one of the
Chilean electricity systems, by an Independant System Oper-
ator (ISO). The ISO produces a dispatch based on a least-cost
criterion (also called “merit-order” operation): hydropower
plants are dispatched so as to minimize the expected operat-
ing costs of the hydrothermal electrical system over a given
planning period (here 4 years). Hence, despite the fact that
this reservoir is not managed directly by its water users, it is
used here for illustrative purposes i.e. to compare the perfor-
mances generated by different operating policies correspond-
ing to different group decision-making approaches. Hence,
no conclusion can be drawn regarding the historical perfor-
mances. The main characteristics of the Colb` un reservoir are
listed in Table 1.
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Fig. 1. Group decision-making approaches and their aggregation
operators.
Table 1. Main characteristics of Colb` un reservoir.
Max storage capacity [hm3] 1515
Dead storage capacity [hm3] 380
Installed capacity [MW] 400
Expected annual production [GWh] 2500
Max turbined release [m3/s] 310
Min head [m] 129
Max head [m] 168
Average annual inﬂow [hm3/yr] 7492
Max annual inﬂow [hm3/yr] 12192
Min annual inﬂow [hm3/yr] 2541
Irrigation water demand [hm3/yr] 3457
In the Maule river basin the development of hydropower
has been a source of tension between irrigators and the hy-
dropower companies because:
– the operation of the hydropower plants affects the hy-
drological regime therefore violating the prior rights of
farmers for constant ﬂows;
– water diverted for hydropower generation does not im-
mediately return to the river therefore bypassing many
farmers.
To mitigate the impact on farmers, hydropower companies
have constructed additional hydraulic infrastructures (irriga-
tion offtakes, canals). This has had practical implications
for the management of the Colb` un reservoir as the eleva-
tion of a major irrigation canal imposes a lower limit on
the storage level therefore reducing the usable storage ca-
pacity by as much as 30% (from 1515hm3 to 950hm3). In
addition, hydropower companies are also bound to respect
pre-deﬁned monthly release targets reﬂecting agricultural de-
mands. Consequently, the number of objectives J for the
Colb` un reservoir is four: (1) hydropower generation (O1),
Table 2. Reservoir objectives.
Hydropower Storage Downstream Future
generation Control irrigation operation
µO1,t µO2,t µO3,t Dn−1
rt + + + +
st + +
rt+1 +
st+1 + +
(2) storage control for ﬂood prevention during the high ﬂow
season and lateral irrigation during the low ﬂow season (O2),
(3) downstream irrigation (O3), and (4) the need to ensure
satisfactory continuing operation, i.e. to avoid future short-
falls in any of the ﬁrst three operating objectives (O4). Ta-
ble 2 lists the objectives and their associated control/state
variables.
The general FSDP model for the Colb` un reservoir can be
written as:
D∗
n(st,at) =
[maxrt{
P3
j=1 ωj,tµ
p
Oj,t(st,at,rt)+
P
at+1 ρ(at+1 | at)ω4,tD∗p
n−1(st+1,at+1)}]p−1
(16)
with the same restrictions on the state and decision variables
as in Eq. (11). The membership functions µOj and weighting
coefﬁcients ωi were derived from existing operating rules as
well as from discussions with experts familiar with the sys-
tem. A ﬁrst set of weights was generated with AHP using the
following information:
– a2,3=a3,2=1 means downstream irrigation O3 and stor-
age control O2 are equally important for equity reasons
(because both serve irrigators)
– a2,1=a3,1=3 means O3 and O2 are moderately more
important than hydropower O1
– a2,4=a3,4=5 means O3 and O2 are strongly more im-
portant than O4
– a1,4=3 means O1 is moderately more important than
O4
The consistency ratio of the corresponding intensity ma-
trix A is 0.016, which is considered acceptable as it is
lower than 0.1, and the “theoretical” weight vector is
[0.15 0.39 0.39 0.07]. This weight vector was then adjusted
so as to better reﬂect the subjective assessment of the relative
importances by the three experts familiar with the system:
the sum of the weights of O2 and O3 should not exceed 0.7
and the difference was spread over O1 and O4. The adjusted
weight vector is [0.18 0.35 0.35 0.12].
The shape of the membership function is also an important
factor that will affect the results. Here, the membership func-
tionforthehydropowerobjectiveisthehydroelectricproduc-
tion function normalized on the unit interval as depicted on
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Fig. 2. Examples of membership functions: (a) hydropower objec-
tive, (b) downstream irrigation objective in March.
Table 3. Aggregation parameters.
Egalitarian Utilitarian Egalitarian
Veto-power Dictatorship
Model I Model II Model III
p p→−∞ p=1 p→+∞
ωj no yes no
Fig. 2. An example of a membership function for the irriga-
tion objective is given in Fig. 2.
As mentioned above, this formulation is implemented with
three different aggregation operators corresponding to utili-
tarian or egalitarian approaches to collective choice. There
are therefore three FSDP models as listed in Table 3.
The FSDP-MODEL I corresponds to the egalitarian ap-
proach to group decision-making in which each water user
has a veto power. As pointed out early, this approach is also
the most equitable as the decision maximizes the satisfaction
of the least-satisﬁed water user.
Table 4. Simulated performances.
Egalitarian Utilitarian Egalitarian
Veto-power Dictatorship
Model I Model II Model III
δ [%] 68 70 74
β [%] 95 85 34
γ [GWh] 2195 2214 2247
D∗
n(st,at) =
maxrt minµ,D{µOj,t(st,at,rt),..., P
at+1 ρ(at+1 | at)D∗
n−1(st+1,at+1)}
(17)
The FSDP-MODEL II corresponds to the utilitarian approach
to group decision-making in which each water user no longer
has a veto power but where their relative importance is now
considered. Here, the optimal solutions r∗(st,at) are all
Pareto optimal and compensation between high and low sat-
isfaction degrees is now permitted, which implies that most
water users will perceive these solutions as a “zero-sum”
game.
D∗
n(st,at) =
maxrt{
P3
j=1 ωj,tµOj,t(st,at,rt)+ P
at+1 ρ(at+1 | at)ω4,tD∗
n−1(st+1,at+1)}
(18)
Finally, the FSDP-MODEL III corresponds to the egalitarian
approach to group decision-making in which each water user
is a potential dictator. Although not desirable, this approach
is considered here for comparison purposes.
D∗
n(st,at) =
maxrt maxµ,D{µOj,t(st,at,rt),..., P
at+1 ρ(at+1 | at)D∗
n−1(st+1,at+1)}
(19)
FSDP-derived operating rules are then used in simulation.
Simulation results consist of the end-of-the month storage
level, the monthly release through the turbines, the spillage
and evaporation losses, and the average monthly hydroelec-
tric production. Each simulation run starts with initial vol-
ume in storage of 1449hm3, i.e. a reservoir almost full, and
uses historical monthly inﬂows recorded during the 1988–
2000 period.
6 Simulation results
The performance indicators that are used to investigate the
impact of the different group decision-making approaches on
the performance of the Colb` un reservoir are
– the reliability in meeting downstream irrigation de-
mands δ=P(st≥sT) where sT is the minimum allow-
able storage volume for lateral irrigation
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Fig. 3. Simulated storage levels for different group-decision making approaches.
Fig. 4. The Maule river basin in Chile.
Fig. 5. Representation of the FSDP methodology.
– the reliability in delivering water for lateral irrigation
β=P(rt≥dt) where dt is the target release for down-
stream irrigation in period t
– (iii) the average annual production of hydroelectricity
γ.
Simulated performances corresponding to the three FSDP
models and to the “88–00” time period are listed in Table 4.
TheexaminationofTable4andFig.3revealsthatthethree
conceptions of collective choice yield different release poli-
cies. The egalitarian approach with dictatorship tend to fa-
vor high releases therefore lowering the volume in storage.
The reason is to be found in that this conception of collec-
tive choice concentrates on the satisfaction of the most sat-
isﬁed decision maker, which is here either the hydropower
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company or downstream farmers whose satisfaction degrees
µO1 are in general larger than that of the two other objec-
tives (µO1,µO3>µO2,µO4) because hydropower generation
increases more rapidly with the release term rather that with
the head term. The opposite behavior is observed with the
egalitarian approach with veto power. As a matter of fact,
this approach encourages high pool elevation throughout the
year as both the lateral irrigation and future operation objec-
tivesarelikelytobetheleastsatisﬁedobjectivesifaggressive
release are implemented to meet downstream irrigation water
demands and the production of hydroelectricity.
In between these two extremes, the utilitarian approach
generates more balanced release policies, which is consis-
tent with the fact that trade-offs are now considered be-
tween aggressive and conservative objectives. This approach
explicitly recognizes that high satisfaction levels can com-
pensate lower satisfaction levels in order to derive a policy
that compromises between the two extreme egalitarian ap-
proaches to collective choice. The simulation results speak
for themselves: (i) the storage levels corresponding to the
utilitarian approach lie often somewhere in between the stor-
age levels corresponding to the two egalitarian approaches,
and (ii) this is conﬁrmed by the performance indicators as
(δI<δII<δIII) and (βI>βII>βIII). The same observation
can be made for the average annual production of hydroelec-
tricity (with γI>γII>γIII). The third model generates more
energy because it better exploits the volume in storage with
a drawdown/reﬁll cycle that takes place over the entire reser-
voir.
In practice, the proposed methodology can be seen as
a loop in which, on one hand, waters users provide their
preferences and, on the other hand, these preferences are
processed by the FSDP model which then provides water
users with short and long-term consequences. These conse-
quences must be easily interpreted by water users thanks to
the use of several indicators such as satisfaction, reliability,
resiliency, economic performance (costs vs. beneﬁts, value-
at-risk, cashﬂow-at-risk), etc. The interpretation should then
encourage discussion between water users and ultimately
generates a new set of preferences, and thus a new loop in
Fig. 5, which would lead to consensual solutions.
7 Conclusions
This paper illustrates the impact of various conceptions of
collective choice on the performance of a water resource
system. The group decision-making process is mathemati-
cally formulated as a ﬂexible constraint satisfaction problem
which assumes both quantiﬁcation and commensurability of
preferences. From these demanding assumptions, an aggre-
gation operator must be carefully selected to identify con-
sensual solutions. Results show that extreme conceptions of
collective choice, i.e. veto-power and dictatorship, generate
extreme release policies. Utilitarian approaches appear to be
more consistent even though compensatory effects between
low and high satisfaction levels are not easily accepted by
water users.
The proposed model can provide some insights into how
the decision-making process will affect current and future al-
locations and ultimately the satisfaction of the users. Various
risk indicators can also be derived from long-term simula-
tions which capture the inherent uncertainties attached to this
water resource management problem. The model can also be
used to arbitrate between efﬁciency and equity principles for
allocating water among competing users.
Potential reﬁnements include (i) the improvement of ag-
gregation operators, (ii) the consideration of “public” water
services, i.e. the operating objectives that can be viewed as
public goods (e.g. ﬂood control) and their aggregation with
“individual” objectives (e.g. hydropower, navigation), and
(iii) the elicitation of preferences. Further researches will
concentrate on other decentralized allocation mechanisms
such as capacity sharing (Tilmant and van der Zaag, 2006).
Edited by: D. Savic
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